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A Small but Mighty Docket:
Select Criminal Law and Procedure Cases from the
Supreme Court's 2019-20 Term
Eve Brensike Primus & Jeremy ShurWith its 2019-20 Term disrupted by the COVID-19
pandemic, the Supreme Court released just 53 signed
decisions, the fewest decisions in a Term since the
Civil War.' But the Court's lighter docket still featured important
criminal law and procedure cases touching on what constitutes
reasonable individualized suspicion, the necessity of jury
unanimity, and the proper form of the insanity defense.
The more conservative justices on the Court overwhelmingly
shaped the development of criminal law and procedure this
Term. In the 14 cases summarized in this review, the Chief Justice
and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh agreed in
judgment 11 times. Justice Kavanaugh never joined or wrote a
dissenting opinion, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Gorsuch each dissented only once. A liberal Justice provided the
deciding vote in only three of the summarized cases.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
This Term's two Fourth Amendment cases concerned a
substantive question about the reasonable suspicion standard in
traffic stops (Kansas v. Glover) and a remedial question about
whether the Bivens damages remedy should be extended to
individuals harmed in cross-border, officer-involved shootings
(Hernandez v. Mesa).
Reasonable Suspicion
In Kansas v. Glover,2 the Court upheld as constitutionally
reasonable an investigative traffic stop conducted after a Kansas
police officer ran a truck's license plate through the system and
learned that the registered owner had a revoked driver's license.
According to a statement of stipulated facts, the police officer did
not see the truck commit any traffic violations, nor did he attempt
to identify the driver of the truck before pulling it over. Instead,
he initiated a traffic stop based solely on the information that the
registered owner of the truck had a revoked driver's license. Upon
discovering that the registered owner was indeed the driver, the
officer arrested him and he was charged with driving as a habitual
violator.3 The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision to suppress evidence arising from the traffic stop noting
that, in its view, the officer had only a hunch that the registered
owner was driving and would need to develop more
particularized facts to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's
requirement that officers possess reasonable, articulable, and
particularized suspicion of criminal activity before initiating a
stop. The Supreme Court reversed in an 8-1 decision.
Justice Thomas, writing for everyone except Justice
Sotomayor, held that an investigative traffic stop is reasonable
when an officer learns that the registered owner of the vehicle has
a revoked driver's license so long as the officer lacks information
to negate the inference that the registered owner is driving the
vehicle. The majority emphasized that the reasonable-suspicion
standard is less demanding than the probable-cause standard and
that officers may use commonsense inferences to form reasonable
suspicion. Noting that drivers with revoked licenses frequently
continue to drive and that Kansas's "license-revocation scheme
covers drivers who have already demonstrated a disregard for the
law,"4 the majority believed that the officer was entitled to draw
a "commonsense inference that Glover was likely the driver of
the vehicle, which provided more than reasonable suspicion to
initiate the stop."5 But the majority also made clear that its
holding was narrow and noted that "the presence of additional
facts might dispel reasonable suspicion."6 For example, "if an
officer knows that the registered owner of the vehicle is in his
mid-sixties but observes that the driver is in her mid-twenties,"7
that would dispel any reasonable suspicion.
The concurrence, written by Justice Kagan and joined by
Justice Ginsburg, elaborated on what kinds of "additional facts"
might dispel reasonable suspicion. In addition to "observational
evidence" (which would include an observed divergence in
appearance between the registered owner and the driver, the fact
that a car has two or more registered owners, or observed
attributes of the car suggesting that the car belongs to a car-
sharing service or is a family minivan that is likely to have
multiple drivers),8 Justice Kagan emphasized that "statistical
evidence"9 could also inform the reasonableness of a stop. She
noted that state and local governments often keep statistics about
how often stops discover unlicensed drivers behind the wheel
and individual officers may have their own "hit rates," either of
which could be low enough to negate reasonable suspicion.
The concurring justices also emphasized the importance of
the state driving laws when considering the reasonableness of
assuming that a person with a revoked license would drive again.
Kansas, they noted, "almost never revokes a license except for
serious or repeated driving offenses," which means that the
officer, upon discovering that Glover's license was revoked, had
reason to believe that he had "already shown a willingness to
flout driving restrictions."10 Under those circumstances, it was
Footnotes
1. Adam Feldman, SCOTUSBIog Final Stat Pack, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS
(July 13, 2020), https://empiricalscotus.com/2020/07/13/scotusblog-
final-stat-pack-ot-2019/.
2. 140 S. Ct. 1183 (2020).
3. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-287 (2013).
4. Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1188-89 (2020).
5. Id. at 1188.
6. Id. at 1191.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1193 (Kagan, J., concurring).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1192.
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reasonable to believe that Glover would drive again. The
concurring justices thought the case would be different if Glover's
license had been suspended, since Kansas suspends licenses for
a variety of reasons entirely unrelated to one's likelihood to
violate traffic laws (i.e., for failure to pay fines, fees, or child
support). An assumption that Glover would continue to drive
based solely on his license suspension, therefore, would be based
on a mere hunch and would be constitutionally unreasonable.
Justice Sotomayor, writing in dissent, warned that the Court
had impermissibly "flip [ped] the [Fourth Amendment] burden of
proof' by relieving the government of any obligation to
investigate the identity of a driver when feasible." According to
Justice Sotomayor, the majority's analysis permits courts to rely
on their own judicially supplied common sense instead of
requiring an officer to look for particularized evidence that the
driver of the car is the registered owner or otherwise supply
evidence based on the officer's training and experience to fill that
gap. This, she believes, is inconsistent with precedent
emphasizing that "the reasonable officer's assessment, not the
ordinary person's-or judge's-judgment, [is what] matters."12
The Court's decision in Kansas v. Glover leaves many
unanswered questions that are sure to become the subject of
future litigation. All three opinions analyze the state-law reasons
for revoking a driver's license when thinking about the
reasonableness of assuming that a revoked driver would continue
to drive. Given the wide variation in state-driving-privilege laws,
each state will have to determine whether and when the Glover
assumption is appropriate given the state statutory scheme. And
courts will have to make sense of which additional facts are
sufficient to negate the inference that the vehicle's registered
owner is driving the vehicle.
The Limits of Bivens Claims
In Hernandez v. Mesa,'3 the Court declined to extend the
availability of Bivens'4 claims to those harmed in cross-border
shootings and made it clear that courts should carefully
scrutinize and limit Bivens's implied private action for damages
arising from civil rights violations by federal officers. According
to the complaint, Hernandez and his friends were running back
and forth across a culvert divided by the U.S-Mexico border
when Border Patrol Agent Mesa detained Hernandez's friend.
Hernandez ran back to Mexican territory. Standing on the United
States side of the border, Agent Mesa fired at least two shots at
the fifteen year old, killing him. Hernandez's parents brought a
Bivens claim alleging Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Alito and
joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh, affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals's
dismissal of the complaint. Justice Alito began by framing Bivens
as the product of an era when "[TIhe Court
the Court "routinely inferred d
'causes of action' that were 'not declned to
explicit' in the text of the extend the
provision that was allegedly availability of
violated."15 Relying on its recent Bivens claims to
decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi,16 the those harmed in
Court reasoned that Bivens cross-border
claims should not be made
available to Hernandez because shootings...
the cross-border context is
meaningfully different from all
presently recognized Bivens actions, and "respect for the
separation of powers"'7 counseled against extending the remedy
to the cross-border context. The Court felt that potential effects
on foreign relations and national security concerns argued in
favor of judicial restraint.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, wrote a
concurring opinion urging the Court to discard Bivens altogether.
Reasoning that "[t]he foundation for Bivens-the practice of
creating implied causes of action in the statutory context-has
already been abandoned,"18 and noting that the Court has
refused to extend Bivens for 40 years, Justice Thomas wrote that
"nothing is left to do but overrule it."19
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, and
Sotomayor, would have reversed the Fifth Circuit's dismissal of
Hernandez's claim. Noting that the Fourth Amendment
constrains state action and that Bivens's primary purpose is to
deter malfeasance, the dissenters argued that what really matters
when determining whether Hernandez's claim arises under a new
context is the officer's conduct, not "Hernandez's location at the
precise moment the bullet landed."20 Because both Hernandez's
claim and Bivens's claim concern excessive force in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, the dissent would have held the claim
governed by Bivens. The dissent noted that extending Bivens's
damage remedy to the cross-border context was necessary given
that petitioners had no alternative remedies, and the dissenters
were unpersuaded by the majority's separation-of-powers
argument, reasoning that here are no foreign policy or national
security implications in extending a damages remedy to deter
rogue U.S. officers.
The dissent also defended Bivens's doctrine against the
concurring justices' attack, pointing out that "damages have been
regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal
interests in liberty"2' and noting that Abbasi made clear that its
opinion was "not intended to cast doubt on the continued force,
or even the necessity, of Bivens in the search-and-seizure context
in which it arose."22
11. Id. at 1196 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
12. Id.
13. 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
14. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
15. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 741 (quoting Ziglar v Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843, 1855 (2017)).
16. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (emphasizing the limited reach of Bivens







there are "special factors counselling hesitation," and describing the
special factors analysis as animated by separation-of-powers
principles).
Hernctndez, 140 S. Ct. at 749.
Id. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 752.
Id. at 756 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 755 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S., at 389, 395-396).
Id. at 756 (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856).
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"Two highly FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Two highly anticipatedanticipated Fourteenth Amendment cases
Fourteenth made their way to the Supreme
Amendment Court this term. In these cases, the
cases made Court heard arguments about
their way to the whether the Due Process Clause
Supreme Court mandates a particular form of the
. em. insanity defense (Kahler v.
this term. Kansas) and whether the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial
should be incorporated against the states (Ramos v. Louisiana).
Due Process and the Insanity Defense
In Kahler v. Kansas,23 the Supreme Court once again rejected
a constitutional challenge to a state restriction on the insanity
defense. Building on its prior decisions in Leland v. Oregon24 and
Clark v. Arizona,25 the Court upheld Kansas's limitation of the
insanity defense to evidence that would negate the mens rea of
the crime and refused to require Kansas to adopt an insanity test
that turned on a defendant's ability to recognize that the crime
was morally wrong.
At Kahler's capital murder trial, he wanted to argue that he
should be found not guilty by reason of insanity because he
could not tell the difference between right and wrong when he
committed the crime. Kahler's desired defense has been
recognized in common-law jurisdictions for centuries, was
elevated to canonical status by the watershed M'Naghten's Case,26
and is currently accepted by a majority of states. But such a
defense is futile in Kansas, which (along with four other states)
recognizes only a narrow form of the insanity defense that
requires defendants to show that mental illness barred them from
forming the requisite criminal intent.
The trial court rejected Kahler's argument that Kansas's
narrow conception of insanity violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, and Kahler was sentenced to
death despite his argument at the sentencing stage that he could
not tell the difference between right and wrong when
committing his crime. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed with
the trial court's ruling and the United States Supreme Court
affirmed in a 6-3 decision.
All of the justices agreed that a successful Due Process challenge
against a state rule about criminal liability must show that the rule
"offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."27 This
history-driven test led the Justices to survey the insanity defense in
common-law jurisdictions, with the majority and dissent
ultimately disagreeing about what the record revealed.
Justice Kagan, writing for the majority and joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh,
analyzed the archives and concluded that the "historical record
is, on any fair reading, complex-even messy"28 Although Justice
Kagan acknowledged that the insanity defense itself is well
established in early English and American jurisprudence, she
found that no particular form of the defense is so well established
as to be considered fundamental. Rather than finding a unified
core of the insanity defense that turns on whether a defendant
can tell the difference between right and wrong, Justice Kagan
saw "various formulations of the insanity defense, with some
favoring a morality inquiry and others a mens rea approach."29
Ultimately, the majority reasoned that this "motley sort of history
cannot provide the basis for a successful due process claim."30
Though the majority believed that the Constitution permits
Kansas to disregard a defendant's capacity to recognize right from
wrong at the guilt phase, it deemed it significant that such
evidence becomes relevant at sentencing. At the sentencing phase
in Kansas, the defendant may argue to the judge that mental
illness precluded them from differentiating between right or
wrong when committing the crime, and the judge may use that
information when deciding the defendant's sentence. Therefore,
Justice Kagan reasoned, "Kansas does not bar, but only channels
to sentencing, the mental health evidence that falls outside its
intent-based insanity defense."31
Justice Breyer, writing in dissent for himself and Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor, was thoroughly unconvinced by this
argument, reasoning that "our tradition demands that an insane
defendant should not be found guilty in the first place."32 Unlike
the majority, the dissenters thought the historical record was
clear. Turning to English and early American sources, Justice
Breyer remarked that "with striking consistency, they all express
the same underlying idea: A defendant who, due to mental
illness, lacks sufficient mental capacity to be held morally
responsible for his actions cannot be found guilty of a crime."33
Disputing a central tenet of the majority's argument that
common-law insanity defenses ranged from focusing on moral
culpability to mens rea, the dissent reasoned that "la]t common
law, the term mens rea ordinarily incorporated the notion of
'general moral blameworthiness' required for criminal
punishment."34 Therefore, whether framed in terms of mens rea
or moral culpability, Justice Breyer believed common-law jurists'
reasoning "linked criminality to the presence of reason, free will,
and moral understanding. "35 The dissent found the moral
incapacity defense equally accepted by early American jurists
and, tracing the test through the present, observed that "45
States, the Federal Government, and the District of Columbia
continue to recognize an insanity defense that retains some
23. 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020).
24. 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (holding that the Constitution does not require
adoption of the "irresistible impulse" test).
25. 548 U.S. 735 (2006) (holding that Arizona could rely on an insanity
test stated solely in terms of the capacity to tell whether an act
charged as a crime was right or wrong).
26. 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H. L. 1843).
27. Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027 (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,
798 (1952)).
28. Id. at 1032.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1032 n.8.
31. Id. at 1031.
32. Id. at 1049 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 1039.
34. Id. at 1042.
35. Id. at 1040.
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inquiry into the blameworthiness of the accused."36 Summing
these various factors, the dissent concluded that Kansas has
"eliminated the core of a defense that has existed for
centuries"37-a core which the dissenting Justices would have
held is mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.
Kahler leaves the insanity defense in considerable peril.
Beyond its consequences for the contours of an insanity defense,
Kahler is instructive for understanding how the Supreme Court
conceives of the Constitution's role in constraining the states'
criminal laws. Though the majority and dissent agreed that the
Due Process Clause requires the states to recognize elements or
defenses "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental,"38 the two opinions'
treatment of this standard differed. For Kahler to prevail, the
majority required him to prove that the moral incapacity defense
is "so old and venerable-so entrenched in the central values of
our legal system-as to prevent a state from ever choosing
another."39 Therefore, when the Justices in the majority turned to
the historical record, they looked to a "settled consensus favoring
Kahler's preferred insanity rule."40 Finding no such consensus,
the majority rejected Kahler's claim.
The implications of Kahler, therefore, extend well beyond the
insanity defense. The majority's conception of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause requires states to adhere only
to that which is supported by a settled consensus and entrenched
in the central values of our legal system. This standard for
constitutionalizing criminal elements and defenses is quite
demanding and leaves a great deal of discretion to state
legislatures. It remains to be seen how the states will respond to
Kahler, but it is likely that the Court's decision has diminished
the Due Process Clause's capacity to constrain them.
Incorporating the Unanimous Jury Trial Right
In Ramos v. Louisiana,41 the Supreme Court overruled
Apodaca v. Oregon4 2 and held that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause incorporates the Sixth Amendment right to
a unanimous jury verdict against the states. Ramos was
convicted of a second-degree murder based on a 10-2 jury
verdict. In 48 states and the federal courts, that vote would have
resulted in a mistrial. But Ramos was tried in Louisiana, a state
which, alongside Oregon, permitted convictions by
nonunanimous juries.43 Ramos argued that the Sixth
Amendment right to a unanimous jury was fundamental and
should be incorporated against the states, and the Supreme
Court agreed.
Justice Gorsuch wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kavanaugh. The
majority began by pointing out the "Kahler leaves
racist origins of state laws .
permitting convictions by they
nonunanimous juries, emphasizing defense in
how Louisiana and Oregon both considerable
wanted to use the nonunanimous peril."
jury rule to "establish the
supremacy of the white race" and
suppress the votes of minority jurors.44
Turning next to the text and history, the majority concluded
that a unanimity requirement was a fundamental part of the Sixth
Amendment's right to a jury trial. The Court then had to address
its 1972 decision in Apodaca, which upheld Oregon's
nonunanimous jury verdict rule. As the Ramos majority put it,
Apodaca was a "badly fractured" decision.45 Five justices in
Apodaca agreed that unanimous verdicts were constitutionally
required by the Sixth Amendment. But one of those five-Justice
Powell-defected on the incorporation question. Although he
agreed that "history and precedent" supported unanimity, Justice
Powell had his own dual-track theory of incorporation (which
had already been rejected by the Court majority). Thus, based on
his own outdated view of incorporation, Justice Powell joined the
four justices who did not think that "unanimity serves an
important 'function' in 'contemporary society"'46 and upheld
Oregon's nonunanimous jury rule. Citing "the prior 400 years of
English and American cases requiring unanimity,"47 "the fact
[that] this Court has said 13 times over 120 years that the Sixth
Amendment does require unanimity,"48 and the fact that "five
Justices in Apodaca said the same,"49 the Ramos majority rejected
the Apodaca plurality's cost-benefit, functionalist analysis as
inappropriate, noting that "it is not our role to reassess whether
the right to a unanimous jury is 'important enough' to retain"
because fundamental constitutional rights cannot be "balance[d]
away aided by no more than social statistics."50 After a stare
decisis analysis, the majority agreed to overturn Apodaca and
held that convictions by nonunanimous juries in state courts are
unconstitutional.
Justices Sotomayor and Kavanaugh both wrote separate
concurring opinions espousing their views on stare decisis.
Justice Sotomayor emphasized that overruling Apodaca was not
necessary because a majority of justices disagreed with it, but
because it was "an opinion uniquely irreconcilable with not just
one, but two, strands of constitutional precedent well established
both before and after the decision,"51 referring to the Court's
recognition that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimity and its
thorough rejection of Justice Powell's dual-track theory of
incorporation. Justice Kavanaugh noted that stare decisis is more
strict in statutory cases than constitutional ones, but that in
Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1038.
Id. at 1027 (quoting Leland, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952)).
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1034.
140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
406 U.S. 404 (1972).
Louisiana began mandating unanimous jury verdicts for crimes
committed after January 1, 2019, but defendants accused of crimes
committed before that date were still subject to convictions by
nonunanimous juries. See 2018 La. Reg. Sess., Act 722.
44. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1394.
45. Id. at 1397.
46. Id. at 1398 (quoting Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410).
47. Id. at 1400.
48. Id. at 1399.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1402.
51. Id. at 1409 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).









"When defense either case the Court needs "a
special justification or strongcounsel grounds"52 to justify overruling
announced he precedent. He then listed factors
had no other that the Court has looked to find
mitigation such a justification or ground: "the
witnesses, the quality of the precedent's
trial judge reasoning; the precedent's
consistency and coherence with
questioned th at previous or subsequent decisions;
decision..." changed law since the prior
decision; changed facts since the
prior decision; the workability of
the precedent; the reliance interests of those who have relied on
the precedent; and the age of the precedent"53 Finally, he
expressed his view that these factors fold into three broad
considerations: (1) "[I]s the prior decision not just wrong, but
grievously or egregiously wrong?" (2) "[H]as the prior decision
caused significant negative jurisprudential or real-world
consequences?" (3) "[W]ould overruling the prior decision
unduly upset reliance interests?"54 Applying his test to Apodaca,
Justice Kavanaugh found that the decision was "egregiously
wrong," "causes significant negative consequences" (including
putting a stamp of approval on the racist origins of the practice),
and "would not unduly upset reliance interests."55
Concurring in the judgment only, Justice Thomas took the
same approach to incorporation that he took in Timbs v.
Indiana6 last Term. He would incorporate the right via the
Privileges and Immunities Clause instead of relying on the Due
Process Clause.
Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Kagan,
dissented. The dissenters would have retained Apodaca because
of the "enormous reliance the decision has engendered."57
Louisiana and Oregon have tried thousands of cases without
unanimous jury verdicts in reliance on Apodaca, and these states
now "face a potential tsunami of litigation on the jury unanimity
issue."58 The majority acknowledged that Oregon and Louisiana
may have to retry hundreds of defendants whose cases are
currently pending on direct appeal and that will "surely impose
a cost," but the Court noted that "new rules of criminal
procedures usually do" impose costs and emphasized that prior
convictions in only two States will be affected.59
Just how expensive this will be for Oregon and Louisiana will
be determined next Term. The Court has agreed to hear Edwards
v. Vannoy,60 which will address whether Ramos should apply
retroactively to cases on collateral review. Interestingly, three of
the five opinions in Ramos discuss the retroactivity question.
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor, declined to rule on the retroactivity question but
acknowledged that Teague v. Lane6i "left open the possibility of
[applying a new criminal procedure rule on collateral review] for
'watershed rules' 'implicat[ing] the fundamental fairness [and
accuracy] of the trial."'62 Justice Kavanaugh does not think
Ramos is a "watershed" rule and would bar its application on
collateral review. And Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice
and Justice Kagan, questions whether Ramos would even be
considered a "new rule" for purposes of a Teague analysis given
some of the Justices' stated views that Apodaca's fractured nature
means it was not binding precedent. We will have to wait until
next Term to see how the Court will rule.
SIXTH AMENDMENT
Andrus v. Texas63 marks the fifth time in the last 20 years that
the Court has recognized deficient performance by a trial attorney
in a capital case based on counsel's failure to investigate and
properly prepare for a capital-sentencing hearing.64 A surprise
addition to the Court's docket, Andrus was never argued. Instead,
the Court issued a per curiam opinion that granted certiorari, held
that trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, and
remanded the case to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to
decide whether counsel's ineffective representation prejudiced
Andrus at the punishment phase of his trial.
Andrus was twenty years old when he was charged with
capital murder for shooting and killing two individuals during a
failed carjacking attempt while high on PCP-laced marijuana. At
trial, his attorney readily conceded Andrus's guilt, made no
opening statement, presented no defense case, and instead
informed the jury that the trial will "boil down to the
punishment phase."65 But, at the punishment stage, trial counsel
again presented no opening statement, failed to lodge any
objections to the state's case in aggravation, and only briefly
cross-examined the State's witnesses. When it was time to present
mitigation evidence, defense counsel was woefully unprepared.
He asked Andrus's mother to testify even though he had been
forewarned that she might be hostile to Andrus's case (and she in
fact then lied on the stand saying that Andrus had no access to
drugs in her home). Counsel then asked Andrus's father to testify,
even though counsel met the father for the first time in the
courtroom and the father had not seen his son for more than six
years and had only lived with him for a year. Defense counsel
never met with Andrus's other family members, nor did he
investigate Andrus's mental health, despite a mitigation expert
raising mental health as an issue before trial. When defense
counsel announced he had no other mitigation witnesses, the
trial judge questioned that decision, which prompted defense
counsel to call three additional witnesses: an expert who testified
that drug use during adolescence alters the human brain; a
prison counselor who explained that Andrus had begun to
52. Id. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1414-15.
55. Id. at 1416-19.
56. 139 S. Ct. 682, 691-98 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
57. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1436.
59. Id. at 1406.
60. Edwards v. Vannoy No. 19-5807.
61. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
62. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
63. 140 S. Ct. 1875 (2020).
64. See also Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009); Rompilla v. Beard.
545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
65. Andrus. 140 S. Ct. at 1878.
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demonstrate remorse when the trial started; and Andrus himself.
Andrus explained that his mother was a drug dealer, that he
spent much of his childhood alone, and that he had been heavily
using drugs since the age of 15, but his testimony was short,
undeveloped, and contradicted his mother's testimony. The jury
recommended a death sentence.
During state habeas proceedings, Andrus alleged that his trial
attorney had been constitutionally ineffective at the sentencing
phase and a "tidal wave of information . . . with regard to
mitigation"66 came out. Andrus's childhood was marked by
physical abuse, hunger, an absent father, and a drug-addicted and
constructively absent mother. Andrus was diagnosed with affective
psychosis at the age of ten or eleven and was placed in juvenile
detention at the age of sixteen for serving as a lookout while his
friends stole a purse. While in detention, Andrus was medicated
and subjected to long periods of isolation "for purported
infractions like reporting that he had heard voices telling him to do
bad things."67 He became suicidal and later tried to take his own
life in prison while awaiting his capital murder trial.
The trial court recommended that Andrus be granted habeas
relief in the form of a new sentencing hearing, but the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals disagreed, concluding that Andrus "had
'fail[ed] to meet his burden under Strickland v. Washington.'"68
Andrus then petitioned the Supreme Court for relief.
In its per curiam decision, the Court thought it "clear that
Andrus' counsel provided constitutionally deficient performance
under Strickland"69 for three reasons: (1) "[C]ounsel performed
virtually no investigation"70 and offered no tactical reasons for this
failure; (2) "[M]uch of the so-called mitigation evidence that
[counsel] offered unwittingly aided the State's case in
aggravation," which "confirms the gaping distance between his
performance at trial and objectively reasonable professional
judgment;"7 ' and (3) "Counsel also failed to conduct any
independent investigation of the State's case in aggravation [and
therefore] could not, and did not, rebut critical aggravating
evidence."72 Having found deficient performance by trial counsel,
the per curiam decision remanded the case to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals for a prejudice determination after noting that
the state court had not fully considered whether counsel's
performance prejudiced Andrus at the sentencing phase.
Justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch dissented from the per
curiam decision, because they believed that the lower court
found that any deficient performance was not prejudicial, and
they agreed with that assessment.
Like most Strickland ineffectiveness holdings, Andrus is fact
specific in its analysis of trial counsel's failure. But the Court's
willingness to decide this case summarily and the consistency
with which the Court has "[TIhe Court
intervened to stop trial counsel
ineffectiveness at capital paved the way
sentencing hearings suggests a for the federal
broader principle. At least with government
respect to failures to investigate to execute
and prepare for capital- individuals for
sentencing hearings, "[m]uch of the first time in
the Court's language . . . seems ,,
to ignore the Strickland y s
presumption that defense
counsel's decisions are strategic
[instead] flip[ping] that presumption [and] suggesting that the
failure to investigate will result in a finding of deficient
performance absent the government's ability to make a strong
showing of strategic reasons for the failure."73
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
In Barr v. Lee74 and Barr v. Purkey75 the Supreme Court granted
the federal government's emergency applications for relief and
summarily vacated several decisions by lower courts that would
have put federal executions on hold long enough for the lower
courts to address inmates' Eighth Amendment challenges. In so
doing, the Court paved the way for the federal government to
execute individuals for the first time in 17 years. Barr v. Lee, like
last term's decision in Bucklew v. Precythe,76 rejected an Eighth
Amendment claim that using pentobarbital sodium to execute
prisoners would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. And
Barr v. Purkey rejected without an opinion a federal inmate's claim
that he was mentally incompetent and should not be executed
under Ford v. Wainwright77 Both decisions were made overnight
and drew sharp dissents from multiple justices.
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan,
dissented in Lee to criticize the majority's decision as dangerously
speedy Observing that the parties had produced hundreds of
pages of briefs and that the District Court had the benefit of two
weeks to deliberate before making its decision, Justice Sotomayor
believed that the majority's overnight decision was made without
proper consideration.78 In Purkey, Justice Sotomayor, joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, would have held that the
Government had not met its heavy burden of vacating a stay based
on the ample evidence suggesting that Purkey's Alzheimer's Disease
left him unfit to be executed.79 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, wrote separately in both cases to emphasize the
problems of delay and arbitrariness that infect the capital
punishment regime and urged the Court "to directly examine the
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"[T]he Fifth PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW
. . The Supreme CourtCircuit had unanimously vacated two Fifth
erroneously Circuit Court of Appeals cases this
applied plain- Term to correct that Circuit's
error doctrine to misapplication of plain-error
a preserved doctrine. In Davis v. United
error." States,81 the Supreme Court
issued a per curiam opinion to
clarify that plain-error review
applies to unpreserved factual as well as legal arguments. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had refused to even engage in a
plain-error analysis in Davis's case, because his unpreserved
argument-that his state and federal offenses were part of the
"same course of conduct" such that his sentences should run
concurrently rather than consecutively under the federal
sentencing guidelines-was factual in nature. Noting that "there
is no legal basis for the Fifth Circuit's [outlier] practice of
declining to review certain unpreserved factual arguments for
plain error,"82 the Supreme Court made clear that "[t]he text of
Rule 52(b) does not immunize factual errors from plain-error
review. "83
In Holguin-Hernandez v. United States,84 the Supreme Court
again unanimously vacated a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in a case involving plain-error doctrine. This time the
Fifth Circuit had erroneously applied plain-error doctrine to a
preserved error. While on supervised release, Holguin-
Hernandez was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to
five years in prison. The government asked the district court to
find that Holguin-Hernandez had violated the terms of his
supervised release and asked for an additional 12-to-18-month
consecutive sentence under the federal sentencing guidelines.
Holguin-Hernandez's counsel argued that there was no reason for
additional prison time and asked the court to impose either no
additional time or less time than the government's proposal. The
district court imposed a 12-month consecutive sentence,
drawing no further objections from defense counsel. Holguin-
Hernandez appealed arguing that the 12-month sentence was
unreasonably long under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), but the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that he had not properly preserved
this claim because he failed to "object in the district court to the
reasonableness of the sentence imposed."85
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, held that a defendant
preserves an objection to the substantive reasonableness of a
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) by advocating for a shorter
sentence at the sentencing hearing. The majority first noted that
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51, which lays out the
process for preserving claims of error, "intended to dispense with
the need for formal 'exceptions' to a trial court's rulings."86 Thus,
when Holguin-Hernandez advocated for no additional sentence,
"judges . . . would ordinarily understand"87 that he was arguing
that a longer sentence would not achieve the purposes of
sentencing. "Nothing more is needed to preserve the claim that a
longer sentence is unreasonable."88
Justice Alito wrote a brief concurrence, joined by justice
Gorsuch, to emphasize that this case decided only that Holguin-
Hernandez had properly preserved his generalized, substantive
unreasonableness claim, not that "a generalized argument in
favor of less imprisonment will insulate all arguments regarding
the length of a sentence from plain-error review."89 This case, he
noted, did not address how to preserve a claim that the trial court
employed improper procedures, nor did it rule that Holguin-
Hernandez properly preserved particular substantive-
reasonableness arguments.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Supreme Court considered two statutory interpretation
cases this Term, both of which resulted in unanimous decisions.
First, in Shular v. United States,90 the Supreme Court again
interpreted a sentencing enhancement in the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA). The ACCA requires that those convicted
of unlawful possession of a firearm be given a minimum 15-year
sentence if they have three prior convictions for certain violent or
serious drug offenses.91 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) states that
"serious drug offenses" include any "offense under State law,
involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent
to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance."92 When
Shular pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, his
sentence was enhanced under the ACCA on the basis of prior
Florida drug convictions that involved selling cocaine and
possessing cocaine with the intent to sell it. Shular objected to
the enhancement, noting that Florida law does not require
knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance to convict. He
argued that "serious drug offenses" must have a mens rea
element, and Florida law offered only an affirmative defense
based on lack of knowledge. He encouraged the Supreme Court
to employ "a generic offense matching exercise" under which it
would "define the elements of the generic offenses identified in §
924(e)(2)(A)(ii), then compare those elements to the elements of
the state offense."93 Because Shular's prior offenses did not
contain a mens rea element, unlike the generic offense that likely
would have been produced by such an exercise, Shular hoped
that the Supreme Court would invalidate the sentence
enhancement.
The Supreme Court rejected his argument and held that §
924(e)(2)(A)(ii)'s "serious drug offense' definition requires only
that the state offense involve the conduct specified in the federal
statute."94 Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that
140 S. Ct. 1060 (2020).
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1061.
140 S. Ct. 762 (2020).
746 Fed. Appx. 403 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
Holguin-Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 766.
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88. Id.
89. Id. at 767 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
90. 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
93. Shular, 140 S. Ct. at 784.
94. Id. at 782.








drug offenses lack universal terminology, so one cannot read the
subsection and automatically conclude that it refers to generic
drug offenses. In this way, she explained, it is different from the
enumerated-offense clause of the ACCAs "violent felony"
provision where the statute refers to "burglary, arson, or
extortion"-offenses that more readily lend themselves to a
generic-offense-matching analysis.
Further, the Court focused on the word "involv[e]" in the
statute, noting that it is "natural to say that an offense 'involves'
or 'requires' certain conduct."95 Had Congress intended to refer
to generic offenses, Justice Ginsburg reasoned, it would have
substituted "is" for "involving," as it had done elsewhere within
the statute.96 Believing the statute to be sufficiently clear, the
majority also rejected Shular's plea to invoke the rule of lenity
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a brief solo concurrence to agree with
this last point and emphasize that "the rule of lenity [only]
applies when a court employs all of the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation and, after doing so, concludes that the
statute still remains grievously ambiguous, meaning that the
court can make no more than a guess as to what the statute
means."97
In a second statutory construction case-Kelly v. United
States98-the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of those
involved in the notorious "Bridgegate" scandal,99 holding that the
federal fraud statutes only criminalize deceptive schemes that
have money or property as their object and that the prosecution
had not proven that the Bridgegate perpetrators had such goals.
In 2013 New Jersey's then-Governor Chris Christie sought to
build a bipartisan coalition of mayors endorsing his reelection
campaign. When the mayor of Fort Lee refused to support the
Governor, two members of Gov. Christie's political team
conspired with the Deputy Executive Director of the Port
Authority to punish him and send him a message. They planned
to reduce the typical three lanes reserved for Fort Lee's drivers
entering the George Washington bridge to one lane, hired an
extra toll collector to ensure that drivers would still be able to
enter the bridge when the only lane's toll collector needed a
break, mobilized government employees to funnel traffic into
one lane, devised a cover story that the lane shift was part of a
traffic study, told Port Authority engineers to collect some data to
support their cover story, and then watched as Fort Lee became
stuck in gridlock for four days.
When the scheme was uncovered, all three members of the
conspiracy were indicted on charges of wire fraud,100 fraud on a
federally funded program or entity,'0' and conspiracy to commit
those crimes. One of the scheme's participants pled guilty to
conspiracy and agreed to cooperate with the Government and
the other two defendants were found guilty at trial.
In a unanimous opinion "[Tihe Supreme
authored by Justice Kagan, the
Supreme Court reversed the Court reversed
defendants' convictions. The the Convictions of
Court recognized that the those involved in
scheme was deceitful and the notorious
corrupt, but noted that the 'Bridgegate'
issue in the case was whether scandal."
the defendants committed
property fraud. Both the federal
wire fraud statute and the
federal-program-fraud statute r quire the Government to show
that the officials in question not only engaged in deception "but
that an 'object of the[ir] fraud [was] "property""' 102 As the
majority put it, the federal fraud statutes are not a mechanism
to police local and state officials, but rather are construed as
"limited in scope to the protection of property rights."103 Cast
in this light, the Supreme Court made clear that corrupt
schemes violate the federal fraud statutes only when their aim
is to obtain money or property.
The Government offered two distinct, failing arguments that
the petitioners sought to obtain money or property First, it
argued that the defendants' plot intended to take control of the
bridge lanes themselves, and so had property as its object. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument by explaining that the
lane realignment was "a quintessential exercise of regulatory
power." 04 Referring to Cleveland v. United States,105 which had
reversed another set of federal fraud convictions predicated on a
public employee's corruption, Justice Kagan noted that it is
settled that "a scheme to alter . . . a regulatory choice is not one
to appropriate the government's property"106
Second, the prosecution alleged that the defendants' scheme
sought the Port Authority's money because of the costs of
mobilizing its employees to effectuate the scheme. The Court did
not find that argument persuasive either, noting that misuse of
the government employees' time and labor was not the
petitioners' object but instead "only an incidental byproduct of
the[ir] scheme."107 Justice Kagan reasoned that if this incidental
byproduct was enough to sustain a conviction, every regulatory
decision would be subject to prosecution since these decisions
tend to depend on the time and labor of government employees.
Such a result would be contrary to the Supreme Court's repeated
instruction that federal prosecutors cannot police state and local
public officials' conduct with federal fraud statutes. As the Court
put it, "federal fraud law leaves much public corruption to the
States (or their electorates) to rectify,"108 including the conduct at
issue in the Bridgegate scandal.
95. Id. at 785.
96. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
97. Shular, 140 S. Ct. at 789 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
98. 140 S. Ct. 1565 (2020).
99. Kate Zernike, The Bridge Scandal, Explained, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/nyregion/george-
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100. 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
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"[T]he Supreme HABEAS CORPUS
The Supreme Court decidedCourt issued one immigration-habeas case and
an important two post-conviction cases this
immigration- Term. In Department of
habeas decision Homeland Security v.
that may Thuraissigiam, the Supreme
effectively cut off Court issued an important
federal judicial immigration-habeas decisionthat may effectively cut off
review for federal judicial review for
millions of millions of people facing
people facing summary deportation. In the
summary post-conviction context, the
deportation." Court decided Banister v. Davis,
which addressed the scope of the
successive petition barrier, and
McKinney v. Arizona, which considered the application of the
Court's retroactivity doctrine.
Immigration Habeas
In Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam,109 the
Supreme Court rejected Suspension Clause and Due Process
challenges to statutory restrictions on the ability of an asylum
seeker to obtain federal habeas corpus review of expedited
administrative removal proceedings. In so doing, Justice Alito,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh, held that the Suspension Clause does not give
noncitizens an opportunity to resort to federal habeas corpus
review to assert their rights to remain lawfully in the country
Thuraissigiam is a Sri Lankan national who crossed into the
United States without authorization and was apprehended
within 25 yards of the border. He sought asylum, but failed to
persuade immigration officials that he had a "credible fear of
persecution" if he was returned to Sri Lanka. As a result, he was
subjected to "expedited removal" under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2)
and was statutorily barred from seeking habeas review of the
"credible fear" determination in federal court under §
1252(a)(2)(A)(iii).
Thuraissigiam filed a federal habeas petition alleging that he
satisfied the credible-fear test but that he had been denied a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate that in the administrative
process. He argued that the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) provision restricting his
ability to challenge the credible-fear determination in federal
court was unconstitutional and that he should be given a new
opportunity to present his asylum claim. The District Court
dismissed his claims, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed after holding that § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii) violates the
Suspension Clause. The Supreme Court majority disagreed and
reversed, instructing the lower court to dismiss Thuraissigiam's
petition.
Justice Alito began the majority opinion by emphasizing the
limited nature of the Court's analysis: both parties had agreed
that the fate of Thuraissigiam's constitutional Suspension Clause
claim rested on whether the claim would have been cognizable
in 1789. Thus, the Court did not decide whether the scope of the
Clause has expanded since then. With that limitation in mind,
the Court rejected Thuraissigiam's claim because habeas at the
Founding was "a means of contesting the lawfulness of restraint
and securing release"110 and did not encompass requests "to
enter or remain in a country or to obtain administrative review
potentially leading to that result."11 For this reason, the majority
did not find the historical body of precedent Thuraissigiam
offered relevant since none of the cited cases demonstrated a
Founding-era conception of habeas as the appropriate tool for
permitting someone to enter, or potentially enter, a country The
majority then dispensed with cases from the late 19th and early
20th century by interpreting them as based "not on the
Suspension Clause but on the habeas statute and the
immigration laws then in force."ii2
As for Thuraissigiam's Due Process argument, the majority
rejected the claim that he was owed more Due Process rights than
those who have yet to enter the country because he made it 25
yards beyond the southern border. Instead, Justice Alito wrote
that, "[w]hile aliens who have established connections in this
country have due process rights in deportation proceedings, the
Court long ago held that Congress is entitled to set the
conditions for an alien's lawful entry into this country and that,
as a result, an alien at the threshold of initial entry cannot claim
any greater rights under the Due Process Clause."113
Justice Thomas joined the majority but wrote a separate
concurrence to explain his understanding of the Suspension
Clause's original meaning. According to him, the Founders
understood the habeas privilege "to guarantee freedom from
discretionary detention, and a 'suspen[sion]' of that privilege
likely meant a statute granting the executive the power to detain
without bail or trial based on mere suspicion of a crime or
dangerousness."i14 Because the expedited removal procedure in
the IIRAIRA does not authorize detention "based on mere
suspicion of a crime or dangerousness,"i15 it does not, he wrote,
amount to a suspension.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred only in
judgment and would have narrowly confined the case's holding
to Thuraissigiam's as-applied challenge for three reasons. First,
because Thuraissigiam was apprehended just 25 yards from the
border, he was owed less process than those who had established
residence in the United States. Second, although styled as raising
legal error, the concurrence understood Thuraissigiam's petition
to be based on allegations of factual error, and the concurring
justices thought that precluding habeas review of removal
proceedings' factual findings was permissible. Finally, Justice
Breyer emphasized that Thuraissigiam's procedural claims
concern "not the outright denial (or constructive denial) of a
process, but the precise way in which the relevant procedures
were administrated," which raises "fine-grained questions of
109. 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1969.
112. Id. at 1976.
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degree" that are not the traditional function of the "limited role'
that habeas has played in immigration cases similar to this
one."116
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, dissented and
accused the majority of "flout[ing] over a century of this Court's
practice.""7 She took issue with the majority's attempt to frame
Thuraissigiam's petition as claiming "a right to enter or remain in
a country"118 Instead, she maintained that Thuraissigiam raised
mixed questions of fact and law and legal challenges to
procedural defects in the removal procedures, which are
precisely the kinds of claims that courts have historically
entertained in habeas proceedings. Justice Sotomayor also took
issue with the majority's originalist approach, describing the
majority's search for a common-law analogue at the time of the
Founding as "an exercise in futility"" 9 given that no analogous
immigration restrictions existed at the Founding. For the
dissenters, it was enough "that common-law courts at and near
the founding granted habeas to noncitizen detainees to enter
Territories not considered their own."120 Finally, with respect to
Thuraissigiam's Due Process claims, the dissent proclaimed that
"[n]oncitizens in this country ... undeniably have due process
rights."121 Given that "presence in the country is the touchstone
for at least some level of due process protections,"122 the dissent
regarded Thuraissigiam's immigration status as no bar to his
claim for constitutional protections. Raising the alarm that the
majority's contrary assertion lacked any sound limiting principle,
Justice Sotomayor warned that the majority's holding "is not
administrable, threatens to create arbitrary divisions between
noncitizens in this country subject to removal proceedings, and,
most important, lacks any basis in the Constitution."1
2 3
Post-Conviction Habeas
In Banister v. Davis,124 the Supreme Court held that a motion
to alter or amend a district court's habeas judgment filed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) does not qualify as a
successive petition. For Banister, the distinction was important
because it determined whether his appeal from the federal
district court's denial of his habeas petition was timely filed. If his
filing was a motion to alter or amend the original judgment
under Rule 59(e), the 30-day time limit for filing an appeal
would be tolled until the federal district court ruled on the
motion, and his appeal would be timely. But the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals deemed his filing a successive habeas petition
and, as a result, dismissed his appeal as untimely The Supreme
Court voted 7-2 to reverse the Fifth Circuit's ruling and held that
Rule 59(e) motions are not successive petitions but are "part and
parcel of the first habeas proceeding. "125
In an opinion authored by Justice Kagan and joined by all but
Justices Thomas and Alito, the Court looked to historical
precedents and the purposes of "[Tihe Court
the statutory successive petition
barrier to conclude that Rule looked to
59(e) motions are not historical
successive. As a historical matter, precedents and
the majority noted that Rule the purposes of
59(e) was derived from the the statutory
common-law practice of successive
amending judgments; courts
historically exercised this petition barrier
practice in habeas and non- to conclude that
habeas cases alike; and these Rule 59(e)
motions were routinely treated motions are not
as "attendant on the initial successive."
habeas application"126 rather
than collateral or successive
attacks on a judgment.
Turning to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's
(AEDPA) purposes and the point of its successive petition barrier,
the majority noted that treating Rule 59(e) motions as part of the
initial habeas application furthers rather than undermines
AEDPAs aims of "reducing delay, conserving judicial resources,
and promoting finality"1 27 Rule 59(e) motions must be filed
shortly after the initial judgment, may not contain arguments
that could have been raised before, improve the efficiency of the
judiciary by permitting district courts to either quickly dispose of
meritless claims or rectify their mistakes before the appeal, and
consolidate appellate proceedings thereby avoiding piecemeal
appellate review. For these reasons, the majority noted, Rule
59(e) motions are different from motions for relief from
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). A Rule
60(b) motion is a separate, collateral attack on a judgment that
can be filed long after the original federal district court decision,
and courts have historically treated 60(b) motions that raise new
substantive arguments as successive petitions in the habeas
context.128 The majority did not consider itself bound by the
Court's previous holding in Gonzalez v. Crosby129 that
substantive Rule 60(b) motions are successive habeas petitions.
Instead, the majority announced that Rule 59(e) motions are
simply "a limited continuation of the original proceeding-
indeed, a part of producing the final judgment granting or
denying habeas relief."130
The dissent, written by Justice Alito and joined by Justice
Thomas, chided the majority for putting too much stock in how
a motion is labeled and would have treated Banister's motion
under the rubric set forth in Gonzalez for Rule 60(b) motions for
relief from judgment. Under that regime, if the motion asserts a
substantive habeas claim by attacking the court's prior decision
on the merits, the dissenters would deem it a successive petition,
116. Id. at 1992 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment only).
117. Id. at 1993 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1994.
119. Id. at 1998.
120. Id. at 2001.
121. Id. at 2012.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2013.
124. 140 S. Ct. 1698 (2020).
125. Id. at 1702.
126. Id. at 1707.
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128. See Gonzalez v Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005).
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130. Banister. 140 S. Ct. at 1710.
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"Finally, in but if it raises only a nonmerits,
procedural problem with theMvcKIlnney V. underlying decision, it would not
Arizona, the be successive. Because Banister's
Court confronted motion made substantive
a thorny arguments, Justice Alito would
retroactivity have deemed it successive and
question..." the resulting appeal untimely
Finally, in McKinney v.
Arizona,131 the Court confronted
a thorny retroactivity question that turned on whether an
Arizona resentencing procedure occurred on direct or collateral
review. In 1993, after having been convicted on two counts of
first-degree murder, James McKinney was sentenced to death
based on a judicial finding of the existence of aggravating
circumstances and a judicial determination that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The
Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the sentence in 1996 after
conducting an independent review required by state law.
McKinney then sought federal habeas relief alleging that the
Arizona courts violated Eddings v. Oklahoma132 by refusing to
consider McKinney's post-traumatic stress disorder as a
mitigating factor. In 2015 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
sitting en banc agreed and sent the case back for Arizona to
correct its error. But the legal landscape on capital sentencing
had changed between 1996 and 2018 when the Arizona
Supreme Court issued its second decision. In 2002 the Supreme
Court held in Ring v. Arizona133 that the Sixth Amendment jury-
trial right entitles capital defendants to a jury determination on
the existence of any aggravating circumstances that might qualify
them for a death sentence. And in 2016 the Supreme Court
decided Hurst v. Florida,134 which relied on Ring to strike down
Florida's capital-sentencing scheme as impermissibly allowing a
judge to find aggravating circumstances independent of the jury's
factfinding. McKinney argued that, because the Arizona Supreme
Court was now going to reopen his direct appeal, Ring and Hurst
should apply, and he should be entitled to a jury determination
on the aggravating circumstances. The state argued that
McKinney's case was on collateral review and, thus, he was not
entitled to retroactive application of Ring and Hurst.135 The
Arizona Supreme Court agreed with the state, reweighed the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including
consideration of McKinney's PTSD, and reinstated the death
sentence. McKinney petitioned for certiorari and the United
States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, agreed with Arizona and
affirmed.
Justice Kavanaugh, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch, held that Ring and Hurst did not
apply to McKinney's case. The majority accepted the Arizona
Supreme Court's statement that it was conducting an
independent review in a collateral proceeding, noting "we may
not second-guess the Arizona Supreme Court's characterization
of state law."136 The majority then held that the Arizona Supreme
Court had acted in accordance with Clemons v. Mississippi137
when it reweighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
itself, refusing McKinney's attempt to distinguish Clemons
because his case concerned a court impermissibly ignoring a
mitigating circumstance whereas Clemons involved an improper
weighing of aggravating circumstances. According to the
majority, there is "no meaningful difference for purposes of
appellate reweighing between subtracting an aggravator from one
side of the scale and adding a mitigator to the other side."1 3 8
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, dissented from the majority's refusal to apply Ring and
Hurst. The dissenters emphasized that the nature of McKinney's
2018 proceeding before the Arizona Supreme Court "is a
question of federal constitutional law, not an issue subject to state
governance."139  Observing that McKinney's most recent
proceeding was analyzed de novo under the same docket number
and with the same docket entries as McKinney's original appeal,
Justice Ginsburg wrote that "the Arizona Supreme Court was ...
rerunning direct review to correct its own prior harmful error"140
such that Ring and Hurst should have applied.
A LOOK AHEAD
The 2020-21 Term features an interesting slate of criminal law
and procedure cases. In addition to addressing the retroactivity
of Ramos in Edwards v. Vannoy, the Court will consider Torres v.
Madrid and address whether an officer's unsuccessful attempt to
detain a suspect by using physical force is a seizure or if the
officer's use of force must be successful for an individual to be
seized under the Fourth Amendment.141 Next Term will also
include Jones v. Mississippi, in which the Court will consider
whether juveniles must be found "permanently incorrigible" to
be constitutionally sentenced to life in prison without parole
under the Eighth Amendment.142 And the Court will hear its first
big Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) case in Van Buren v.
Unites States143 to address whether a person who is authorized to
access computer information for some purposes violates the
CFAA by accessing the same information for an improper
purpose.
The upcoming term's criminal-law docket is also notable for
not including any cases concerning qualified immunity During
the second half of the 2019-20 Term, America experienced a
widespread movement in support of racial equality and against
systemic injustice against Black Americans. Sparked by the police
131. 140 S. Ct. 702 (2020).
132. 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding that a capital sentencer may not
refuse as a matter of law to consider relevant mitigating evidence).
133. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
134. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
135. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (holding that Ring
does not apply retroactively on collateral review).
136. McKinney, 140 S. Ct. at 708.
137. 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (holding that a state appellate court can
uphold a death sentence based in part on an invalid or improperly
defined aggravating circumstance by reweighing the valid
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating evidence).
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killing of George Floyd, the Black Lives Matter movement 
pushed police brutality and the laws and systems that facilitate it 
into the public eye. So when a series of cases concerning the 
scope of qualified immunity knocked on the Supreme Court's 
door, many wondered whether the Supreme Court would 
answer. It did not.144 Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, 
Justice Thomas indicated that he believes the qualified immunity 
had become unmoored from its common-law roots and that 
there "likely is no basis for the objective inquiry into clearly 
established law that our modern cases prescribe."145 We will have 
to wait for another Term to see if a majority of the Court will 
ultimately agree with him. 
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